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CLEAR CONSENSUS, AMBIGUOUS
COMMITMENT
Christopher H. Schroeder*
ECO-PRAGMATISM. By Daniel A. Farber.
Chicago Press. 1999. Pp. xi, 210. $23.

Chicago:

University of

I.
Americans from every demographic, socioeconomic, racial, and
ethnic category identify themselves as concerned about the environ
ment, and most say that they have personally taken steps to reduce
pollution or improve environmental quality in some way.1 One of the
most salient cultural and social signatures of the contemporary era in
the United States, and throughout much of the world, has been the
diffusion of a desire to protect, preserve, and restore features of the
natural environment to a greater degree than current practices and
policies do.2 These environmental concerns are not only widely
shared, they have been extended to become a wide policy agenda. No
longer confined to preserving national parks or eliminating the most
noxious forms of smog and the most obvious kinds of water pollution,
the environmental agenda has expanded to embrace the preservation
of open spaces, critical habitats, wetlands, tropical rain forests, and
other natural areas; the reduction of all forms of harmful pollution and
emissions; and the reformation of personal habits of consumption and
corporate practices of production that underlie the supply and demand
of products that directly or indirectly harm the environment. Envi
ronmental implications are everywhere and they have seeped into eve
ryone's consciousness.
The first Earth Day, April 22, 1970, is a convenient marker for the
launch of the Environmental Era, in which this pro-environment atti
tude gained a political critical mass, producing an impressive set of

* B.A. 1968, Princeton; M.Div. 1971, Yale; J.D. 1974, University of California, Berkeley.
- Ed. Nicole Wilson, Duke University School of Law Class of 2001, provided valuable re
search assistance for this Review.

1. See infra Part III.
2. One of the best exegeses of the social, cultural, and economic changes that have con
tributed to modem environmentalism is found in SAMUEL HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH AND
PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTALPOLmcs IN THE UNITED STATES (1987).

1876

May 2000]

Ambiguous Commitment

1877

legislative and policy responses.3 In a frenzied half-decade after Earth
Day, Congress enacted almost all of the major pillars of modern fed
eral environmental policy - the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969,4 the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1 970,5 the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,6 the Federal Environ
mental Pesticide Control Act of 1972,7 the Marine Protection, Re
search, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,8 the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972,9 the Endangered Species Act of 1973,10 the Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1974,11 the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976,12 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,13 and
the Toxic Substances and Control Act of 1976.14 A number of other
statutes could be added to this list.15 Together, they constitute the
foundation of an elaborate regulatory system that has undergone a
number of refinements and midcourse corrections, a few significant

3. It is quite accurate to observe that environmentalism had already gained considerable
momentum in the 1960s, without which Earth Day would have not been the notable event
that it was. For different accounts of the origins of the early environmental legislation, see,
e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory ofStatutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985); Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Proce
dure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59 (1992); Christopher H. Schroeder, Ra
tional Choice Versus Republican Moment Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 29 (1998). An excellent summary of the policy agenda that
confronted Congress in the early 1970s can be found in MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING
.AFI'ER EARTH DAY: PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLmcs (1999).
4. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361
(1994)).
5. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671g
(1994)).
6. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1994)).
7. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 975 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y
(1994)).
8. Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445
(1994)).
9. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464
(1994)).
10. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(1994)).
11. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f - 300j-26
(1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
12. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
(1994)).
13. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k
(1994)).
14. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671
(1994)).
15. Zyg Plater identifies 34 important environmental statutes enacted in the three years
after the National Environmental Policy Act. See ZYGMUNT PLATER ET AL., NATURE,
LAW & SOCIETY TEACHER'S MANuAL app. (1992) (historical statutory appendix).
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additions, such as the Superfund legislation,16 increased commitments
to cooperating in improving international environmental problems,
and accretions of additional complexity, but very little significant re
trenchment.
When the Republican Party assumed control of Congress in 1994
for the first time in forty years, Republican leaders in the House
thought they had caught the crest of a wave of citizen discontent to
ward every manifestation of big government, including the extensive
federal regulation of the environment. Trying to cash in on that mo
mentum, they made rollback of environmental regulation one of their
prime objectives.17 Although the House succeeded in enacting a ma
jority of the other elements of the Republicans' Contract with
America, its leaders were quite chastened by the backlash of voters
toward their environmental deregulatory agenda. The 104th Congress
closed its books with very little to show for the House leadership's de
regulatory efforts.18 While the Republicans have not abandoned their
ambitions to rein in environmental regulations, they have "shrunk
back from trying to restructure the system."19 As Republican Senator
John McCain put it, by showing themselves "too eager to swing the
meat ax of repeal when the scalpel of reform is what's needed," the
Republican leadership had succeeded in making their stewardship of
the environment "the voters' number-one concern about continued
Republican leadership of Congress."20 After narrowly retaining the
House majority in the 1996 elections, this leadership turned in the
meat ax, and is now trying the scalpel approach, seeking more meas-

16. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.).
17. See Robert L. Glickman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach
of) the Contract with America: Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environ
mental Protection?, 5 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y, Winter 1996, at 9.
18. This recent experience mintics a sintllar sequence of events that took place when
President Reagan came into office in 1981. At that time, "[a]pprehension over inadequate
environmental protection by government, along with increased societal attention to envi
ronmental problems such as toxic wastes and ozone depletion, led to a significant resurgence
of public support for environmental protection in the 1980s." Robert Emmet Jones & Riley
E. Dunlap, The Social Bases ofEnvironmental Concern: Have They Changed over Time?, 57
RURAL Soc. 28, 30 {1992). Similar resurgence occurred in 1994 and 1995, because in both
cases, the deregulators overestimated the popularity of their program with the voters. The
net result in both cases was negligible overt progress in rolling back environmental legisla
tion, although in each case implementation of existing statutes was delayed, underfunded, or
redirected, at least for a time. For a summary of appropriations riders that reduce funding
for environmental enforcement, or constrain implementation of environmental legislation in
other ways, see Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Backdoor Legislating (visited Jan. 10,
2000) <http://www.nrdc.org/nrdcpro/fpprog.htm>.
19. Allen Freedman, GOP's Secret Weapon Against Regulations: Finesse, CONG. Q,
WKLY. REP. 2314 {Sept. 5, 1998) (quoting House Republican David Mcintosh).
20. John McCain, Nature ls Not a Liberal Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1996, at A31.
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ured and selective efforts to reduce the burden of complying with en
vironmental laws - estimated to equal about $143 billion in 1999.21 In
the words of one Republican congressional leader, "If you have rea
sonable goals and you sit down with reasonable people in the admini
stration, then maybe you can accomplish something."22
These recent events confirm that environmentalism has had a
staying power on the public agenda that is surprising to political ob
servers who have seen other policy issues rise and then fade. On the
twentieth Earth Day, David Broder, columnist for the Washington
Post, captured a prevailing interpretation of this persistent environ
mental concern when he wrote that:
[a]t one level, the environmentalists have swept away all opposi
tion. The 'conservation ethic' has become one of the fixed
guiding stars of American politics - a 'value question' that
permits only one answer from anyone who hopes to be part of
the public dialogue. . . . [T]he argument is no longer about val
ues. That's over, and the environmentalists have won. The ar
gument is now about policies. And those with the best evidence
and the best arguments, not just the purest hearts, will prevail.23
Environmental protection has thus become a "valence issue[ ]" - like
improving the economy or reducing crime - "where virtually every
one supports the goal, thus confining potential disagreement to the
means by which these ends can be achieved."24
Of course, disputes ostensibly about means can be just as conten
tious and long-standing as disputes explicitly addressed to ends. Not
withstanding their valence status - or perhaps because of it - envi
ronmentalism and environmental issues remain major sources of
policy disagreement due to the fact that after thirty years of grappling
with environmental issues, environmental questions press us more
than ever, 'Vith some of them, such as global warming, posing chal
lenges to our governance institutions that never have been faced be
fore.

21. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS: THE
COST OF A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT 8-51 tbl. 8-12a (1991); Paul R. Portney, Environmental
Policy in the Next Century, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORTI1ES: THE 2000 ELECTIONS AND
BEYOND 359, 367 n.14 (Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer eds., 1999) ("The producer
price index for capital equipment was used to convert 1986 dollars to current dollars.").
22. See Freedman, supra note 19, at 2316.
23. David Broder, Beyond Folk Songs and Flowers, WASH. POST., Apr. 22, 1990, at B7.
24.
(1995).

JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY
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II.
In Eco-pragmatism, Daniel Farber25 attempts to sketch a consensus
approach to environmental policy built upon the claim that we have
moved beyond the "value question." The book takes our "profound
national commitment to environmental protection" (p. 1) as a "given"
(p. 3). It suggests that the next stage in developing our environmental
problem-solving capabilities requires determining "how best to use
whatever tools are available to make intelligent judgments in hard
cases" (pp. 70-71). Hard cases are those that pose the vexing question
of what "priority [we ought to give our environmental] values" (p. 3),
when those values clash with others that we also think important, such
as the value of maintaining and improving economic well-being. Eco
pragmatism argues that we can discover a basic framework for ad
dressing those hard cases by examining the content of the commitment
our society already has made to the environment.
Eco-pragmatism rewards the reader in many different ways. For
instance, environmentalism's forward-looking, preventative focus of
ten entails actions that have significant benefits and costs spread
across long time spans, under conditions of substantial uncertainty
about their actual effects. Any framework for environmental deci
sionmaking must cope with the problems posed by such long time
frames and uncertainty. The book contains valuable discussions of
these problems offering important insights into dealing with them.26
Professor Farber also draws on his extensive study of the landmark
Reserve Mininfi27 litigation, interleaving more analytical discussions of
issues with close attention to the facts of that dispute and its aftermath
to illustrate various points in his argument. Anyone who has taught or
studied Reserve Mining will value the book as an extended commen
tary on the case.
The central claim of the book is that our already-in-place national
commitment to environmental values implies that we should approach
all environmental decisions using a framework that Professor Farber
dubs "eco-pragmatism." The book's main pre-occupation, and this
Review's main focus, is Professor Farber's defense of this claim.
Eco-pragmatism starts from a "pro-environmental baseline" (pp.
93-132), from which analysis of environmental problems always begins
"with a presumption in favor of protecting the environment except
where infeasible or [where costs are] grossly disproportionate to the
benefits" (p. 94). These exceptions are necessary because it would be
25. Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
26. In addition to passing discussion throughout the book of these and other basic issues
in environmental policymaking, Professor Farber devotes individual chapters of the book to
these two particularly central questions. See pp. 133-98.
27. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
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"absurd" to embrace a policy that completely ignores the burdens of
compliance costs (p. 3). Concern about such compliance costs can
sometimes elide two kinds of hard cases, which Professor Farber dis
tinguishes. First, we can face serious hazards where the costs of re
ducing those hazards further is disturbingly high. Second, we can face
hazards where the probability of harm is extremely low, or where the
harm is not severe (or some combination of these), such that most
people would evaluate the risk as insignificant. The disproportionate
costs proviso addresses the first set of cases. The insignificant risk
proviso addresses the second set. In toto, then, Professor Farber ar
gues for a "hybrid approach" to environmental problem solving, ac
cording to the principle that "[t]o the extent feasible without incurring
costs grossly disproportionate to any benefit, the government should
eliminate significant environmental risks" (p. 131).
In theory, the insignificance proviso should be less controversial
than the one addressing gross disproportionality. Only the hardiest
zealot wants society to expend scarce resources eliminating insignifi
cant risks. If we ever reach the point where our most serious policy
disputes arise over the desirability of pursuing insignificant risks, we
will either have lost our moorings entirely, or arrived there only be
cause all significant risk issues have been satisfactorily resolved.28 In
contrast, instances of the disproportionality problem arise with some
frequency. Environmental problems often exhibit the "90-10" phe
nomenon, a shorthand label for the realization that reducing the last
increments of an environmental risk (for example, the last 10%) incurs
the vast preponderance of the costs (for example, 90% of the total).29
Sometimes this very-costly-to-remove residuum will pose an insignifi
cant residual risk, thereby morphing into the more tractable problem.
Other times, however, the risk will remain significant, but removing it
will still be very costly. Ought we to stop short of reducing the risk to
the point of insignificance? Under Professor Farber's eco-pragmatic

28. This is not to say that the insignificant risk proviso is without its controversies. Peo
ple disagree enormously over what constitutes a significant risk. Sensitive to the implica
tions of declaring a risk to be insignificant, federal agencies and elected officials have always
shied away from giving the term a cogently articulated definition. Typical of the official tip
toeing around the issue, when the EPA undertook a rulemaking to define a cognate term,
"acceptable risk," under the original version of § 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412
(1976) (superseded), it ultimately shied away from any transparently objective definition,
choosing instead to identify factors and ranges of values that would establish presumptions
or be relevant to the overall conclusion. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants, 40 C.F.R. pt. 61 (1999); Benzene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants,
Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels, Benzene Equipment Leaks, and
Coke By-Product Recovery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044 (1989); see also ROBERT PERCIVAL
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 497-507 (3d ed. 2000)
(summarizing the rulemaking).
29. E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 11-12 (1993) (discussing
the "90-10" phenomenon, which he refers to as the "problem of 'the last 10 percent' ").
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framework, we should when the abatement costs are "grossly dispro
portionate" to the benefits achieved.
Professor Farber's hybrid framework approaches environmental
problems from a different perspective than does conventional cost
benefit analysis. CBA typically determines the value of the benefits
and the costs of a regulatory action by calculating what the persons af
fected by the decision would be willing to pay to avoid the adverse ef
fects or to receive the benefits of the action.30 Much of Eco
pragmatism concerns itself with explaining why the hybrid framework
is superior to CBA-based frameworks.
Professor Farber is a practicing pragmatist generally, as well as in
his environmental scholarship,31 thus we ought to expect not only that
he would advance a proposal to proceed with environmental quality
measures pragmatically, but also that he would defend the proposal
with pragmatist arguments. On this score, Eco-pragmatism does not
disappoint. By approaching his topic pragmatically, Professor Farber
deftly steps around a number of knotty debates in the literature, such
as whether private or public values ought to guide our policies, or
which set of philosophical premises best grounds environmentalism.
The reservations expressed in this Review come from one interested
in pursuing pragmatic considerations even further than Eco
pragmatism does.
Eco-pragmatism asserts that the hybrid framework commends it
self to us because it is already rooted in our practice, so that it func
tions largely to "make explicit the predominant values underlying
much of our current regulatory system" (p. 11). Initially, this seems a
rather nonpragmatic claim, insofar as pragmatism is associated with a
forward-looking instrumentalist analysis. Pragmatists, though, do not
ignore past practices. Pragmatism involves a form of "inquiry that is
at the same time contextualist and instrumentalist," which understands
human thought to be constituted "out of a background of practices . . .
as well as being practical, in the sense of purposively directed to ac
tion. "32 Because practices can reflect settled expectations and strongly
held beliefs,33 dislodging those expectations and beliefs will incur dis30. As an alternative to willingness to pay, CBA can use valuations based on willingness
to accept. See discussion infra notes 50 to 52 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability ofPractical Reason: Statutes, Formalism
and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis:
Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163; Daniel Farber,
Shocking the Conscience: Pragmatism, Moral Reasoning, and the Judiciary, 16 CONST.
COMMENTARY 675 (1999) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)).
32. Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal
PRAGMATISM 254, 255 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).

Pragmatism, in

THE

REVIVAL

OF

33. Practices can also be repositories of knowledge. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Prag
matic Adjudication, in Dickstein, THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 32, at 235, 238:
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location and uncertainty costs that pragmatists must take into account.
Thus decisions, which might otherwise be justified if embedded in an
other society or another time, may not be justified in our own here
and now, given our social, cultural, and legal context.
Our existing environmental practices certainly do include many
examples of regulatory standards set on the basis of technological and
economic feasibility. Along with health- or environment-based stan
dards and some cost-benefit balancing standards, these feasibility
based standards make up the bedrock bases for pollution control
within environmental policy.34 Many of the acronyms to which envi
ronmental law seems so attracted, such as BAT, MACT, and LAER,35
represent different forms of feasibility-based standard setting, al
though none of them explicitly captures all three of Professor Farber's
critical elements (feasibility checked by grossly disproportionate costs
and insignificant risks). Feasibility analysis is not a purely domestic
product, either. Across the pond, the British often approach environ
mental standard setting with a BATNEEC requirement - "best
available technology not entailing excessive cost"36 - which approxi
mates the hybrid framework. All in all, approaches to regulation that
instruct industry to do all that is practicable or feasible - but only up
to a point - are a firm part of our existing environmental practice.
Of the three major approaches to risk regulation, technology
based analysis can also lay a solid claim to superiority on several dif
ferent grounds. Since the early days of the Environmental Era, expe
rience has shown that by using technology-based controls, environ
mental, health, and safety agencies have been able to complete a
higher number of regulations, have those regulations survive judicial
challenges, and subsequently have them implemented more expedi
tiously by the regulated community compared to the other two types
of regulation.37 As some evidence of this, on several occasions when
[Past decisions] are repositories of knowledge . . . and so it would be folly to ignore them
even if they had no authoritative significance. . . . [A] decision that destabilized the law by
departing too abruptly from precedent might, on balance, [also] have bad results. . . . The
pragmatist judge thus regards precedents, statutes and constitutions both as sources of po
tentially valuable information . . . and as signposts that he must be careful not to obliterate
or obscure gratuitously, because people may be relying upon them.

34. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 28, at 150-53 (explaining how standards are set
under each basis of pollution control).
35. BAT stands for best available technology. See Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R.
§ 141.2 (1999); see also C.C. LEE, DICTIONARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL TERMS 67
(1997). MACT is maximum available control technology. See 40 C.F.R. § 63.51; see also
LEE, at 390. LAER is lowest achievable emissions rate. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501 (1994); see also
LEE, at 372.
36. On BATNEEC, see JAMES CONNELLY & GRAHAM SMITH, PoLmcs AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 160-62 (1999).
37. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW
97-133 (1989) (summarizing experience under numerous statutes regulating carcinogens);
Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Stan-
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Congress has been faced with a sorry record of accomplishment under
an existing health-based regime, it has amended the relevant statute
and switched to a feasibility framework, which then has resulted in
more environmental progress being made.38
In a democracy, practices that capture public sentiments are very
difficult to dislodge. As Abraham Lincoln noted, "public sentiment is
everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail. Without it,
nothing can succeed."39 Ultimately, the argument to which Professor
Farber attaches the most significance in defense of the hybrid ap
proach rests on its faithfulness to the public sentiment. Better than
any other, this approach "best . . . captur[es] our society's fullest un
derstanding of the values at stake" in environmental decisionmaking
(p. 92), whereas approaches involving cost-benefit analysis, even when
those approaches adopt an environmental baseline and are "hu
manely" applied, "would not do justice to our community's values and
would to some degree trivialize our national commitment to the envi
ronment" (p. 122).
I do not believe that this argument can be successfully defended
when it is made with reference to environmental issues generally. Al
though it is almost self-evident that in the past thirty years we have
placed environmental concerns firmly on the public agenda as some
thing the public cares about and is willing to devote resources to ad
dress, the more detailed structure of our commitments - how far we
are willing to go in advancing those interests and what trade-offs we
are prepared to make - remains very much a work-in-progress for the
coming years. Having said this, there is one subcategory of environ
mental concern in which the case for a pro-environmental baseline
stands on firmer ground: when significant risks to human health are at
stake, risk reduction up to the point of feasibility does seem to be the
presumptive approach. Part III takes up these points in more detail.

dards and "Fine-Tuning, " Regulatory Refonns, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985) (canvassing the
major pollution control statutes); Thomas 0. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and
Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 159 (same).

38. Among the significant standards that have been modified to adopt a feasibility
framework are the toxic effiuent controls under the Clean Water Act and the hazardous air
pollutant standards under the Clean Air Act. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 28, at 869,
918-20 (describing changes in the 1977 Water Act amendments adopting feasibility approach
for toxic water effiuents, and changes in 1990 Air Act amendments adopting feasibility ap
proach for hazardous air pollutants). In 1996, Congress adopted changes in the Safe Drink
ing Water Act that closely approximate Eco-pragmatism's hybrid approach. The SDWA
now requires the EPA to set drinking water contaminant levels as close to a health-based
goal as is feasible, but it can stop short of that point if it finds that the benefits achieved by
such a standard would not "justify the costs" necessary to achieve it. See id. at 479-84 (de
scribing statutory changes).
39. William L. Rivers, Appraising Press Coverage of Politics, in POLITICS AND THE
PRESS 35, 53 (Richard W. Lee ed., 1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Before examining the details of our environmental practices and
commitments, however, the remainder of this Part assesses the practi
cal arguments the book makes for the hybrid framework. Traditional
practices backed by strong public sentiment may enjoy the benefit of
the doubt, so that someone wishing to alter significant practices bears
the burden of proof; but if consequentialist arguments clearly counsel
reform, the pragmatist will be inclined to reject those practices and
will seek the best means of accomplishing that reform. In the case of
the hybrid framework, though, practical considerations, in Professor
Farber's view, support rather than undermine the hybrid framework,
thus demonstrating "that the current regulatory system is more coher
ent than it sometimes appears" (p. 11).
The practical arguments for the hybrid framework are not the most
compelling of the book. Ideally, evaluating any environmental stan
dard would include evaluating the impact that the standard, as imple
mented, had or would have on the environment, the economy, and
other relevant factors, and then comparing the results to that stan
dard's alternatives. Eco-pragmatism, however, does not give a clear
picture of what the overall economic and environmental consequences
of the hybrid approach would be, were it applied faithfully across the
entire environmental agenda. In fairness, such evaluations are diffi
cult. Reliable baseline environmental data is sketchy at best; moni
toring systems to track changes in environmental indicators are sparse.
Even were such data available, changes in environmental indicators
can only answer the before and after question - what was the state of
the environment before the regulations were imposed and what it is
after - when the relevant question is the with and without question
- what is the state of the environment with the regulations in place
and what would it have been without them. The answers will differ
because environmental degradation is influenced by factors in addi
tion to federal regulation, such as changing norms, and the economy,
as well as state, local, and private actions that might have been taken
had not the federal regulation intervened. Still, the inability to trace
the hybrid framework's effects on the status of the environment inevi
tably leaves an instrumentalist evaluation of that framework stuck
with second-best measures.
Instead, Professor Farber concentrates on comparing the hybrid
framework to cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The amount of attention
CBA receives throughout the book, as well as the fact that Professor
Farber adds the insignificant risk and disproportionate cost provisos to
blunt the force of CBA-based objections to his proposal, confirms that
he considers CBA to be the main challenger to his approach.
From the perspective of CBA, the environmental problem is a
problem of achieving the correct balance between the environment's
use as a resource in support of preferences that would consume it and
its use as a resource in support of preferences that would preserve it.
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The "economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to
maximize the value of production."40 Whereas CBA's critics scorn it
for reducing life, limb, and the environment to production inputs,
CBA advocates criticize the feasibility approach because decisions
under it do not even attempt to strike a balance between benefits and
costs so as to achieve some overall socially desirable result.41 Imposing
controls on industry to the limits of feasibility can result in "treatment
for treatment's sake," as when paper pulp plants are required to install
technology controls to prevent the discharge of effluent into the Pa
cific Ocean, where it is causing no discernible damage.42 Even where
some damage or risk is discernible, a feasibility standard may push
controls to such a point that the costs of removing the last increment
of pollution far exceed the economic benefits from doing so. In either
case, the result is a loss of social resources that might be put to alterna
tive uses, and hence a failure to maximize the value of production.
Professor Farber finds considerable merit in these criticisms, and
the disproportionate costs and insignificant risks provisos serve to pre
vent the hybrid framework from insisting that we implement environ
mentally protective measures simply because we are technologically
and economically capable of doing so. By disarming some of the most
severe CBA-based criticisms in this way, Eco-pragmatism brings the
results of the hybrid approach into some proximity with what CBA it
self might dictate in a good number of cases. Indeed, Professor Farber
regularly downplays the decisional differences between the hybrid ap
proach and environmentally sensitive CBA. "In large part," he says,
"[the dispute between advocates of CBA and feasibility analysis as
sumes] that the distinction is outcome determinative" (p. 91), when it
is not. "The results of a cost-benefit analysis by an environmentally
sensitive agency may not necessarily differ very much from the results
of a sensible feasibility analysis."43
The concessions to CBA generate an obvious question: Why not
simply adopt CBA as the basic approach and then modify it as neces
sary? Although he advances some practical reasons for preferring the
hybrid framework over CBA, the root problem seems to be that CBA

40. Ronald Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
Adler and Posner, for example, term feasibility approaches "nonaggregative," in so
far as those approaches do "not seek to determine (or to approximate) the aggregate effect
of the project with respect to one or more . . . constituents of well-being, or prerequisites for
well-being, or proxies for these." Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cos/
41.

Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 229 (1999).
42

See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

P. 115; see also p. 82 ("[While] [o]n its surface . . . feasibility analysis looks very dif
ferent from a cost-benefit analysis. . . . the difference may not be quite as complete as it ap
pears."); p. 113 ("Sunstein-style balancing and an environmental baseline might often lead to
the same results . . . . ) .
43.

"
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adopts a "neutral" stance toward environmental values, a neutrality
that is inconsistent with our national environmental commitment.44
This is an odd objection to lodge against CBA, however, as it
seems as capable of being tilted toward environmental protection as
does the hybrid approach. First, a pure CBA could be supplemented
with a pro-environmental proviso, much as Professor Farber supple
ments a pure feasibility approach with his two provisos. Even propo
nents of CBA, as well as others who generally advocate greater quan
tification of risks and attention to trade-offs between benefits and
costs, frequently insist that value-free or neutral CBA should not be
the final determinant of environmental, health, and safety decisions.
They acknowledge that the results of a CBA can be supplemented to
take considerations other than individual willingness to pay. When
questioned during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings about his
view that society regularly mishandles the 90-10 problem, for example,
then-Judge Stephen Breyer told Senator Joseph Biden that the deci
sion as to how much money to spend to save life is
the kind of decision - my goodness, it is health. It is safety. There is no
economics that tells you the right result in that kind of area. There is no
economics that tells . . . us how much we are prepared to spend . . . on the
life of another person. . . . [T]hat is . . . a decision that people will make
through their elected representatives . . . .45
Herman Leonard and Richard Zeckhauser, strong advocates of cost
benefit and risk-benefit analysis, likewise embrace a moderated ap
proach to CBA.46 They concede that
every important social value [cannot] be represented effectively within
the confines of cost-benefit analysis. Some social values will never fit in
a cost-benefit framework and will have to be treated as "additional con
siderations" in coming to a final decision. Some, such as the nonsacrifice
of human life, may be binding constraints. . . . We fully accept the role of
"untouchable" values as overriding considerations in public decision
making. They do not invalidate cost-benefit analyses; they merely illus
trate that more is at stake than just costs and benefits.47

44. See pp. 94-114 {discussing the neutrality assumption); p. 94 (arguing that the feasi
bility approach incorporates "the environmental norms that our society has unmistakably
embraced.").
45. Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States; Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. 276-77 (1994).
46. I think it is fair to characterize Professors Leonard and Zeckhauser as two staunch
advocates for increased use of cost-benefit analysis in risk-related policymaking. See, e.g.,
Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its
Philosophy and Legitimacy, in VALUES AT RISK 31, 46 (Douglas McLean ed., 1986) ("We
have argued that our normal market and legal system tends to break down when substantial
health risks are imposed on a relatively large population. These are therefore precisely the
situations in which the cost-benefit approach is and should be called into play.").
47. Id. at 42.
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Professor Sunstein's recent proposals for a modified form of cost·
benefit analysis, which Professor Farber describes at some length, also
exhibits a similar willingness to supplement private value·based CBA
with publicly determined considerations.48
These statements are typical. Professor Farber himself concedes
that it is probably impossible to find a "pure bean counter," someone
who insists that pricing all costs and benefits of an environmental
question according to willingness to pay and then comparing the totals
should provide the sole and exclusive information upon which to base
environmental policy.49
Rather than supplementing a neutral CBA with some pro·
environmental proviso, a bias toward environmental values can be in·
tegrated into the CBA itself.50 Before CBA can even be applied, the
analyst must first decide whether to price various factors according to
what a person is willing to pay (WTP) to acquire them or avoid having
them imposed on him, or according to what a person is willing to ac·
cept (WTA) to have a benefit taken away or a cost imposed.51 With
full technical legitimacy, the analyst could ascertain what the benefici·
aries of regulation were willing to accept to forgo the environmental
benefits of the regulation, and then could compare that value to the
willingness to pay of those who would be burdened by the regulation.
Using the beneficiaries' WTAs and the polluters' WTP in this way ef·
fectively assigns the initial right to be free of environmental harm to
its victims, thereby tilting the analysis in favor of the environment,
both as a theoretical and as a practical matter. This approach also al·
lows individuals to express their environmental commitment by de·
manding a high price to relinquish that right, higher than being forced
to pay to avoid losing it.52

48. See pp. 94-114. "In one formulation [of Sunstein's proposal], officials would engage
in a two-stage decision process. The first stage would consist of a quantitative cost-benefit
analysis; the second would introduce other values, 'if any are relevant,' that cost·benefit
analysis leaves out." P. 95.
49. Throughout the book, Professor Farber uses two extreme views, "tree hugging" and
"bean counting,'' as foils for his hybrid approach, but he admits that "it would be hard to
find anyone who takes these extreme positions,'' p. 36, and that "(i]n reality, most people's
feelings are a confused mixture of tree hugger and bean counter." P. 72.
50. E.g., p. 101 ("Cost-benefit analysis purportedly gives equal weight to the interests of
both sides and is therefore unreceptive to the use of moral rights as an analytic tool.").
51. Whether to use WfA or WfP in CBA cannot be resolved by CBA. This indetermi
nacy, and the need to resolve it before a CBA can proceed, is known as the offer/asking
problem. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis ofEntitlement Problems: A Cri
tique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-21 (1981).
52. Two effects can produce a WfA higher than a WfP First, if the right to be free
from environmental harm is highly valued, assigning it to an individual makes her wealthier
than if she did not possess the right. If money has dintinishing marginal utility, the sum
needed to provide utility equal to this right will be greater for her than the sum she would
offer to purchase it. See RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 170-174
(1988) (discussing the wealth effect). Second, experiments show that individuals are averse
.
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The impact of the choice between the prices from WTA and WTP
for environmental benefits can be illustrated using one of Professor
Farber's examples. Professor Farber argues that a high value ought to
be placed on human life in deciding whether costs are grossly dispro
portionate to benefits, but not so high as to be "extravagant" (p. 87).
"For example," he says, "a figure of $50 million would imply that peo
ple would be willing to spend $50,000 apiece to escape a one-in-a
thousand risk of death, which seems implausible" (p. 87). In so saying,
he frames the issue of price in terms of WTP. If the issue is instead
framed in terms of WTA, however, it seems entirely possible and
hardly extravagant that someone would demand to be paid $50,000 be
fore agreeing to have a one-in-a-thousand risk placed on her. A CBA
that employs WTP for costs and WTA for environmental benefits
might well find a $50 million figure to be plausible, and this would al
ter regulatory outcomes significantly. Thus, by selecting WTP and
WTA properly, CBA need not adopt a "neutral, detached stance" to
the question of environmental protection.
Professor Farber is thoroughly aware that the choice between
WTP and WTA is consequential. Yet the only reason he advances for
deciding that CBA must be neutral toward environmental values, and
cannot adopt WTA as a way of biasing its results toward those values,
is that "[a]s a practical matter, economists [perform] contingent valua
tions [the technique for eliciting WTA responses] strongly prefer not
to use WTA because they often get very high or infinite prices or out
right refusals to sell" (p. 100). Curiously, it seems that the fact that
WTA does indeed reflect individuals' placing high values on the envi
ronment, which is just what Professor Farber argues our regulatory
system ought to do, here counts as a reason not to use it. If economists
believe that contingent valuation results are inaccurate indications of
true WTA, say because of poor question design, the response to that
problem could be investing more resources in improving these survey
techniques, rather than j ettisoning the approach entirely.
In addition to the claimed advantage of his hybrid approach with
respect to neutrality, Professor Farber asserts several practical advan
tages for the hybrid framework over CBA in dealing with the com
plexities in public decisionmaking. These claims also do not seem un
assailable. "Feasibility analysis," he says, "stresses nuances (such as
voluntariness, strangeness of risks and concentration of costs on par-

to losses more than they value gains, and hence, they hold onto an asset more vigorously
than they try to acquire that asset. This "endowment effect" operates in circumstances in
which the influence of the wealth effect is minimal. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behav
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1998) (discussing
small-value experiments in behavioral economics where the endowment effect is pro
nounced); Cass Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
217, 224 n.17 (1993) (describing the differences between the wealth effect and the endow
ment effect).
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ticular firms), as opposed to overall cost and mortality reduction" (pp.
72-73). Responding to such "nuances" does seem desirable, because
we now have substantial literature attesting to the fact that the public's
reaction to risky situations takes into account many more features
than simply the magnitude of the harm and the probability of its oc
currence, which is the classic CBA understanding of risk. The public
is less accepting of involuntary risk compared to voluntary risk, of in
equitably distributed risk compared to equitably distributed risk, of
risk from dread causes, such as cancer, compared to risk from causes
such as automobile accidents, and so on.s3
If such qualitative elements of risk ought to play a role in our
regulatory strategy, CBA could be modified to incorporate them as
well. In principle, a more complex CBA could take these additional
dimensions of risk aversion into account. The public's greater aver
sion to involuntary risk, for instance, can be accommodated by ad
justing upward the value of life estimates obtained from labor-market
based studies, in which workers accept a bundle of job-plus-risk at
rates that translate into an implicit value of $3 to $7 million per fatal
ity. Other aspects of public dread of risk, such as the strangeness of
the risk, could be accommodated in similar ways.s4 The particular
costs associated with plant closings and bankruptcies can be brought
into CBA by shifting the object of analysis of the CBA downward
from entire industry categories to specific firms within those indus
tries.ss
Pervasive uncertainty about the actual benefits and costs of envi
ronmental degradation or its reduction supposedly gives another ad
vantage to feasibility analysis over CBA. Because CBA is more
"quantitative and formalized" (p. 168), Professor Farber says it places
greater informational demands on us, demands we cannot ultimately
meet, than does feasibility analysis.s6 Informational demands, how53. See, e.g., PETER SANDMAN, A FORMULA FOR EFFECTIVE RlSK COMMUNICATION
(1991) (summarizing qualitative elements of people's understanding of risk, and collecting
references); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Heuristics and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 709 & tbl.1 (1999) (same).

54. For two sets of approaches to adjustments such as these, see Clayton P. Gillette &
James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1071-79 (1990) and
Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of
Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999). One need not endorse any specific proposals
to accept the possibility that such adjustments can be made.
55. What is cost-beneficial for the industry as a whole may not be so at the firm level
once the adverse health costs, stress on family and anxiety of unemployment, loss of collat
eral jobs in the community, and other firm-specific cost elements are balanced against local
benefits.
56. The "softness of our information base reinforces the argument . . . for placing heav
ier reliance on feasibility analysis than on cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis, be
cause it is more quantitative and formalized, puts higher information demands on the ana
lyst." P. 168. Under feasibility analysis, "[w]e have to know . . . only that the risks are
significant," whereas CBA requires us to know "just how high they are." P. 168. Under fea-
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ever, vary more according to the level of aggregation at which deci
sionmaking takes place under either framework than they do between
the hybrid framework and CBA conducted at the same level of aggre
gation. For instance, the national level cost-benefit analysis that con
vinced the EPA to eliminate lead from gasoline was no more fact in
tensive than the inquiries the EPA must undertake in order to issue a
national BAT standard under the Clean Water Act.57
It is undeniably true that cases like Corrosion Proof Fittings58 place
significant informational demands on CBA and also make it difficult
for CBA to take account of complex or nonquantified values. After
the EPA promulgated a rule phasing out the use of asbestos in a vari
ety of products, the Fifth Circuit reversed on several grounds. Despite
an extremely thorough inquiry into the impact of the asbestos ban by
the EPA, the court found the agency's CBA to be inadequate because
of its failure to gather enough information. It also faulted the EPA for
relying upon "nonquantified benefits" as partially determinative of its
decision under the Toxic Substances Control Act, a risk-benefit bal
ancing statute. The court ruled that "[u]nquantified benefits can . . .
permissibly tip the balance in close cases. They cannot, however, be
used to effect a wholesale shift on the balance beam."59 The court's
apparent view is that nonquantified benefits could perform a tie
breaking role when the outcome was otherwise close, but could not be
considered for more than this.
Neither of these two types of quantification fetishism, though, is
essential to CBA-based frameworks. By statute, Congress could
authorize the incorporation of nonquantified benefits into statutory
standard setting. One model for doing this is the approach taken by
the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996.60 It recognizes the special
vulnerability of infants and children to risks of exposure to food addi
tives and pesticides by instructing the EPA to assess these risks sepa
rately. If the EPA finds the data inadequate for a reliable assessment
of risk, the EPA is authorized to require a tenfold more stringent mar
gin of safety in permissible tolerances.61 In another example, Congress

sibility analysis we have to know "only that the costs are feasible," whereas CBA requires us
to know "just what they will run." P. 168.
57. For a summary of the lead CBA, see PERCNAL ET AL., supra note 28, at 3640. For
a description of BAT standard setting and fact gathering, see WESLEY MAGAT ET AL.,
RULES IN THE MAKING (1986).
58. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
59. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d at 1219. For criticisms of the result, see
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Pro
fessor Seidenfeld, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 525, 54149 (1997).
60. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified as
amended in various sections of7 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).
61. See 2l U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996).
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has recently amended the Safe Drinking Water Act, specifically in
structing the EPA to study both "quantifiable and nonquantifiable"
benefits and costs to determine whether a feasibility-based drinking
water contaminant level imposes costs that are not justified by its
benefits, without any indication that nonquantified factors are to be
used only as tie breakers.62
Under our system of judicial review of administrative action, the
computational demands of precision and formalization are largely set
by the standards of judicial review, and those standards can treat fea
sibility analysis as harshly as Corrosion Proof Fittings treats CBA.
The Supreme Court's Benzene63 decision had a similarly constricting
effect on feasibility analysis. When the Court imposed a "significant
risk" threshold on Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") as a precondition to regulating benzene under the statute's
feasibility approach, Justice Stevens went out of his way to write that
this requirement was not intended to place OSHA in a "mathematical
straitjacket." Nonetheless, it took OSHA ten years to reinstate a
stringent feasibility-based standard for benzene exposure in the work
place.64 Fearing reversal if it did otherwise, OSHA now employs risk
assessment techniques in setting exposure levels for this and other
toxics that are indistinguishable from those used by agencies operating
under statutes that employ CBA frameworks.65
It still might be argued that feasibility analysis will always neces
sarily be less informationally demanding than CBA simply because
only control technology costs are relevant to a pure feasibility ap
proach, whereas under CBA both technology costs and environmental
benefits must be monetized. Professor Farber does not advocate a
pure feasibility approach, however, but rather a feasibility approach
with the insignificant risk and disproportionate cost provisos. The
former commits the hybrid framework to the same type of risk as
sessments that OSHA found so informationally demanding after
Benzene, while the latter looks to CBA to provide a needed "reality
check" (p. 114; internal quotations omitted) on pure feasibility ap
proaches. So an agency using the hybrid framework will be required
to calculate risks, costs, and benefits, just as it would were it using
CBA, then to declare risks to be significant and costs to be propor-

62 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(C), -l(b)(6)(A) (Supp. II 1996).
63. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655
(1980) (plurality opinion).
64. See PERCNAL ET AL., supra note 28, at 511-13 (detailing OSHA's actions after the
Supreme Court decision).
65. Risk assessment has received as much criticism on the basis that it demands preci
sion well beyond the reach of the available data at least as frequently as has cost-benefit
analysis. See, e.g., David Doniger, The Gospel of Risk Management: Should We Be Con
verted?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,222, 10,223 (June 1984); Lisa Heinzerling,
Regulatory Costs ofMythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2042-2070 (1998).
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tionate.66 Disputes and litigation will inevitably arise concerning
where the relevant margins are located,67 and those disputes will re
volve around the results of "formalized and quantified" analytic
methods indistinguishable from methods used in a CBA.
Presently, environmentalists are very skeptical of any CBA-based
framework, as reflected in their solid opposition to the CBA-based re
form measures put forward throughout the 104th Congress.68 That
opposition, however, was significantly driven by the specific proposals
themselves and the identity of the most vocal advocates for them.
That combination produced a widely-shared concern that the actual
purpose of those proposals was, and their ultimate effect would be, to
derail environmental initiatives by imposing informational and ana
lytical burdens on environmental regulators that would hamstring
their ability to implement strong measures whether or not they were
cost-beneficial. They feared "paralysis by analysis" that strategically
turns CBA into an anti-regulatory weapon rather than a regulatory
tool.
Feasibility-based frameworks are not immune from regulatory pa
ralysis, however, as OSHA's history with workplace exposure to ben
zene demonstrates.69 It is hard to see how or why an environmentally
sensitive CBA-based framework70 that employs WTA for environ
mental benefits, employs WTP for costs, adjusts appropriate values to
account for the complexities of the public's attitudes toward different
qualitative aspects of risk, permits the non-tie-breaker use of non
quantified values, and is placed in the hands of "an environmentally
sensitive agency" would present any more significant implementation
obstacles than a hybrid approach that began with feasibility analysis
but contained provisos for disproportionate costs and insignificant
66. "Even the cost of compliance, usually taken as a straightforward economic meas
urement, is subject to great uncertainty." P. 167.
67. Any suggestion that the risk, benefit, and cost assessments inherent in the hybrid
approach will be easier than those under CBA result from the "easy" examples that Profes
sor Farber uses to illustrate. For example, once the city of Duluth installed a filtering system
for its water supply that removed 99.9% of its asbestos content, the estimated risk of fatali
ties from asbestos-related cancer among Duluth's citizens fell to something in the range of 1
death every 600 years. In that case, the $200 million that Reserve had to invest in changing
to a land-based disposal of its mill tailings is easily "grossly disproportionate" to the benefits.
P. 174. There is no need to worry about precise quantification of costs and benefits to draw
that judgment. Such easy cases, however, can be found under a cost-benefit regime, too. In
fact, Professor Farber says as much with respect to the Reserve Mining case itself. Pp. 17475.
68. For an account of regulatory reform efforts during the 104th Congress, see
Glickman & Chapman, supra note 17.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 (discussing the aftermath of the Benzene
decision).
70. Eco-pragmatism's hybrid approach itself employs a CBA that is described as an "en
vironmentally-sensitive analysis - using a high value of life, conservative risk estimates, and
a low discount rate for future benefits." P. 116.
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risks. Conversely, it is not clear why one would be superior to the
other in the hands of an environmentally hostile agency, or when con
fronting an unsympathetic judiciary. As Professor Farber himself de
clares, "Sometimes attitude counts for more than technique" (p. 91).
III.
Practical considerations do not clearly favor the hybrid framework
over CBA. In the end, though, Eco-pragmatism's argument does not
rest on such considerations. Professor Farber argues that the "most
fundamental difficulty" confronting cost-benefit analysis, including
environmentally sensitive cost-benefit analysis, is that it "fail[s] to ac
knowledge the nature of our national commitment to the environ
ment" (p. 96). The hybrid framework, on the other hand, is faithful to
that commitment (p. 131). This Part argues that we simply do not
know enough about the general nature of that commitment to deter
mine whether its structure favors Professor Farber's hybrid approach
or CBA.
We might approach an inquiry into the nature of our commitments
from the perspective of environmental philosophy, and attempt to re
solve the dispute between ecocentric philosophies that argue for pro
tecting the environment because of its inherent or intrinsic value and
homocentric, welfarist philosophies that value only human well-being
as expressed in the private preferences people have for various goods
and services. If we do, though, Professor Farber argues that we are
not likely to develop a constructive, practical approach to environ
mental questions. "In effect, we are being given the following recipe
for deciding environmental policy issues: 'Step 1: Settle the question
originally raised by Plato by providing an indisputable definition of
the nature of "the good." Step 2: Apply the results of step 1 to the
particular problem of environmental quality' " (p. 40). This argument
from the futility of resolving such abstract disputes has long been a
staple of pragmatist thinking.
Instead, Professor Farber presents our national commitment as an
empirical fact. Americans simply have expressed a strong commit
ment to preserve and protect the environment. It is not necessary to
ground this commitme!lt in an abstract philosophical defense, and a
practically minded policymaker will not undertake the attempt.
"[T]he reason most people value the environment is emotional, not
because of some elaborate syllogism. . . . Values are simply not things
that normally require rational justifications."71 Policymakers operat
ing under pragmatist precepts need not invest in finding a more philo
sophically grounded explanation for the environmental values that
71. Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337,
345-47.
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people have, but should simply move on to understanding the meaning
of those values and whether or not they produce sensible results when
placed into action.
Pragmatists are wary, though, of all abstractions, not simply those
seeking to bog us down in endless philosophical disputes. The claim
that we are "committed" to "environmental values" is, pragmatically
speaking, too abstract to be useful. The emotional becomes the pro
grammatic only as it takes concrete form in situations that place our
commitments under the tension of opposing preferences, values, or
emotions. Just so, the pragmatist urges us to focus on how people be
have in order to determine what they believe. "The essence of belief
is the establishment of a habit . . . . [T]he whole function of thought is
to produce habits of action . . . . To develop its meaning, we have,
therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a
thing means is simply what habits it involves."72 The truth of a belief is
established by its "cash value," as found in the consequences of the
idea in the realm of action.73 Consequences only accrue to beliefs
when they are made concrete through action.
What actions are relevant in determining the nature of our com
mitment to the environment? Once again, Professor Farber judi
ciously avoids taking sides in a dichotomous dispute between private
and public values. Tree-buggers favor politics while bean counters fa
vor markets as the institutions that best express the values upon which
policy ought to be based (p. 37). The market privileges self-regarding,
or private, values. Guided by our private preferences, each of us cal
culates which set of market exchanges maximizes our own self
interest. In principle, the political realm privileges public values.
Farber's argument here heroically abbreviates an enormous debate
within political theory, not so much over the values that actually influ
ence public decisionmaking, as to which almost everyone acknowl
edges that private values play a prominent role, but rather over what
kinds of values ought to influence public decisionmaking.
Tree huggers, Farber argues, side with neorepublicans, who have
revived the view that when making public decisions, public-regarding
values should control, and deliberation that offers reasons, rather than
market exchange that offers currency, should provide the forum in
which the public's business is transacted.74 In insisting that public val72. Charles Sanders Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in PRAGMATISM: A
READER 26, 33-35 (Louis Menand ed., 1997).
73. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM AND FOUR EsSAYS FROM THE MEANING OF TRUTH
46 (Ralph Barton Perry ed., 1955); see also James T. Kloppenberg, "An Old Name for a New
Way of Thinking?," in Dickstein, supra note 32, at 84 ("The early pragmatists sought to re
orient philosophy away from interminable and fruitless debates by insisting that ideas should
be tested in practice.").
74. The neorepublican literature is vast For one recent assessment, see PHILIP PETIIT,
REPUBLICANISM (1997).
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ues are all that matter in environmental decisionmaking, however, tree
huggers express a "disdain for the value of private life" (p. 36). The
bean counters make the reciprocal mistake of dismissing public delib
erations over values as cheap talk, mere rhetoric masking an underly
ing universal pursuit of private gain. Along the public-private contin
uum, these two methodologies stand at opposite ends.
Eco-pragmatism argues that a more satisfactorily integrated view
of the self acknowledges that public values, as expressed in arguments
we make and reasons we give about collective decisions, and private
values, as expressed in what resources we are willing to give up in or
der to achieve an objective, are both genuine human values entitled to
be taken into account. Because human well-being is a desideratum
that democratic government ought to pursue, government policy
needs to take into account the burdens that it imposes on citizens, as
well as the benefits that it generates, for burdens have an impact on
individual well-being just as assuredly as benefits do. In keeping with
a principle of democratic equality, the evaluations of policy effects on
individuals made by the individuals themselves enjoy a presumption of
legitimacy.75 Paternalistic overrides of those judgments are not en
tirely out of bounds, but refusing even to consider those judgments in
the first place is unjustified. Accordingly, a more acceptable under
standing of the interaction between politics and the market would not
totally reject one in favor of the other, but would see that
"[g]overnments and markets are both flawed, but useful, institutions"
(p. 58). Together, these beliefs commit Professor Farber to a policy
making structure that accepts the presumptive legitimacy of both pri
vate and public values, as expressed in both political and market are
nas.
A pragmatist, then, would seek to incorporate the actions of indi
viduals in both private decisionmaking contexts and in public contexts
when trying to discern the "habits of action" that must be the true
metrics on which the nature of our belief in environmental values
needs to be calculated. The inquiry would be both comprehensive and
detailed.
The study of how people say they translate their environmental
values into action has become a staple of the survey research industry,
and so survey results J!rovide a good starting point for that inquiry.
One type of question directly probes whether people have changed
their private behavior in response to environmental concerns. In one
such survey, 54% report that they have made some changes in day-to-

75. See p. 68; see, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 100-01 (1989)
(defending the presumption of personal autonomy, which states that "in the absence of a
compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to be the best judge of his
or her own good or interests" (emphasis omitted)).
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day behavior because of their environmental concerns.76
Self
reporting of time spent working for various volunteer causes indicates
the average responder spent about eight hours, over a month's time,
working in some way for environmental causes.77 Sixty-five percent
report that they have made a financial contribution to some environ
mental organization working in their local community78 while even
more, 75% , say that they have contributed to a national environ
mental organization.79 Overwhelming majorities report that they have
voluntarily recycled newspapers, glass, aluminum or motor oil,80 cut
home energy use by increasing building insulation or improving the
home's heating or air conditioning system,81 reduced water use,82 and
avoided purchasing or using aerosol spray cans.83
These behavioral changes provide solid evidence that concern
about the environment has had practical consequences in people's
lives. The picture, though, is not monochromatic. As of 1999, only
42% had cut down on automobile use by car-pooling or taking public
transportation,84 and a mere 29% had decided not to buy a product
because of its producer's environmental record.85
Do such data as these allow us to determine whether the environ
mental commitments that lie behind them are biased in favor of envi
ronmental values in the fashion expressed by the hybrid framework, or
are they more consistent with an alternative explanation, such as that
individuals are performing informal cost-benefit evaluations in decid
ing what decisions to make? The data are much too imprecise for us
to determine such details of the value structure that underlies them.
Many of the environmentally friendly measures that receive high posi
tive response rates - cutting home insulation, upgrading air condi
tioners and heaters, cutting water use, not using aerosol cans - are of-

76. 1993 Cambridge Reports National Omnibus Survey, July 1993 (Question: "Over the
past several years have you made any changes in your day-to-day behavior because of your
concerns about the environment?" Response: Yes, a lot - 22%; Yes, some - 32%) (sur
vey results on file with the author).
77. Gallup Survey, June, 1996 (Question asked for people's "best estimate" of "hours
spent in the past month" in a number of named areas, including the environmental) (survey
results on file with author).
78. Belden and Russonello, Ecology Survey, February, 1996 (survey results on file with
author).
79. See id.
80. Ninety-three percent say they have engaged in such activities. Gallup Survey,
CNN/USA Today Poll, April, 1999 (survey results on file with author).
81. Seventy-four percent say they have done so. See id.
82. Sixty-nine percent report they have "cut [their] household's use of water." Id.
83. Sixty-seven percent say they have refrained from using aerosols. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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ten very cost-effective for the individual consumer in addition to being
environmentally friendly, or else may impose negligible costs. Such
actions are as consistent with individual economic self-interest (or in
difference) as they are with strong environmental preferences. In con
trast, where economic self-interest is more in tension with a pro
environmental response, such as actions that impose more significant
personal cost, perhaps in terms of the personal convenience and mo
bility that people value, such as car-pooling, using public transporta
tion, or boycotting a producer because of its environmental record re
sulting in purchasing something the consumer otherwise would not
have preferred buying, have much lower positive responses.86
Even questions whose responses reflect some willingness to trade
off other preferences for environmental values provide few insights
into someone's commitment to environmental values in those hard
cases in which significant conflicts exist, as in the abatement of signifi
cant risks that requires the expenditure of considerable resources.
Answers to questions about voluntary behaviors, for example, tell us
that individuals will elect to spend some time working for environ
mental causes when they could have spent the time in alternative
ways, such as leisure, but that information says nothing about what
trade-offs would be chosen by them when environmental regulation
becomes very much more expensive than the opportunity costs of
spending eight hours per month on environmental projects.87
Turning to actions in the public forum, we find data compatible
with those from the private realm. A citizen's central action in the

86. The series of questions that elicited the responses in the text accompanying notes 80
to 85 sought to identify actions taken for the reason that they benefited the environment, by
asking, "which of the following things, if any, have you or other household members done in
recent years to try to improve the quality of the environment?" It is possible that the lower
response rate for car-pooling and public transportation is because persons who were engag
ing in such activities for self-interested reasons, such as saving money, or avoiding the stress
and delays of rush hour traffic, would not have responded in the affirmative to the question.
It seems unlikely that this explains all of the negative responses, however, and more likely
that a good part of it is attributable to the conflict between the personal costs of giving up
the convenience of driving to work and the environmental benefits of doing so.
87. Other questions revealing a willingness to make some trade-offs between economic
self-interest and environmental quality include ones that ask people, "How much more per
month would you personally be willing to pay for all the goods and services you use as a con
sumer, if you knew that as a result . . . business and industry . . . would not harm the envi
ronment?" Between 1984 and 1990, the mean response to this question rose from $10.23 to
$36.99 monthly, measured in constant 1990 dollars. See WILLIAM KEMPTON ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL vALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 5 (1995). The 1990 figure represents
approximately 1 % of the median family annual income in the United States, which was
$42,400 in 1990. United States Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables - Families, Table
F-7 (visited July 1, 1998) <http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f07.html>. These re
sponses are consistent with a belief that the environment can be saved without facing harder
trade-offs between economic prosperity and environmental quality, see infra notes 112 to
114 and accompanying text, but they may or may not be consistent with a commitment to all
feasible environmental protection measures, save those with grossly disproportionate costs,
as required by the hybrid framework.
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public arena comes when he or she votes for candidates for elected of
fice.88 In 1994, 41 % of those polled said that a high favorable rating of
a candidate for Congress by environmental organizations would make
it more likely that the responder would vote for that candidate.89 Re
flecting just how much the environment has become a "valence issue,"
only 10% said such a rating would make it less likely that they would
vote for a candidate (the remainder said the rating would not affect
their votes).90 The House Republicans' failure to read these results
precipitated their run-in with the voters over environmental deregula
tion after taking control of Congress in 1994.91
Besides probing how candidates' positions on environmental issues
affect the electorate, surveys also poll on the environmental policies
the public favors. While these responses provide valuable information
regarding public policy, they once again fall short of revealing the un
derlying value structure that supports these preferences.
One question has been asked twice a year since 1973, in the spring
by the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey
(GSS), and in the fall by the Roper organization, so that it provides a
particularly valuable set of data for analysis. The question asks
whether the responder thinks that spending on "improving and pro
tecting the environment" is too little, about right, or too much. The
data show variations from a finding of 61 % reporting that spending
was "too little" in 1973, down to a low of 47% in 1977, a mark that was
almost equaled again in 1980. This figure rebounded during the
Reagan-Bush years, increasing to almost 70% in 1991. The response
rate fell back to 59% in the 1993 GSS Survey.92 An important inter
vening event between 1991 and 1993, of course, was the 1992 presiden
tial election in which Democrat Bill Clinton defeated Republican
George Bush. Because the GSS polls in the spring, President Clinton
had not had time to affect the actual amount of money the federal
government was spending on environmental regulation before the
1993 survey was taken. Therefore, the dip in the "too little" response
was not correlated to any increase in spending. This may suggest that

88. Contributions to national environmental organizations ought to be considered pub
lic forum activity, as well, insofar as most environmental organizations engage in significant
lobbying activities.
89. Mellman, Lazarus, and Lake, Environmental Message from the 1994 Electorate
Survey, November, 1994 (survey results on file with the author).
90. See id.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
92. See Euel Elliott et al., Political and Economic Determinants ofIndividuals' Support
for Environmental Spending, 51 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 15, 20 (1997). Those responding "too lit
tle" dropped back into the low 60s and high 50s during the Clinton administration. In 1996,
the GSS reported the percentage as 61 %. Trend Table for the GSS Question, NATENVIR
(visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss99/trend/natenvir.htm> [hereinafter
GSS Trend Tb!.].
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these responses reflect the public's general sense about whether envi
ronmental policy is on the right track. Because the Democratic party
routinely receives higher marks than the Republican party in its man
agement of the environment,93 more people in 1993 may have con
cluded that the environment was in good hands under President
Clinton than in 1991 under President Bush.
When those responding "just right" to this spending question are
added to the "too little" responders, we see that there is very little
support for reductions in spending. The two consistently combine for
totals in the 80% range. In 1996, for instance, this figure was 89% .94
Polled recently about what priorities the federal government should
address with the anticipated federal budget surpluses, 86% responded
that "increasing spending on domestic programs, such as health, edu
cation, and the environment" should be either a top priority or an im
portant priority.95 Answers to questions such as these reflect an indi
vidual's sense of government priorities, but not in a context that forces
them to evaluate how much worse off they are prepared to become
economically in order to support higher environmental values or more
government spending. In answering these questions, responders may
be premising their responses on an assumption that increased govern
ment spending for the environment would be paid for by shifts of re
sources from other parts of the federal budget, or, in the case of the
surplus related questions, by spending money that the government has
already raised, and that it would spend elsewhere if not on the envi
ronment. In either case, their responses do not tell us what trade-offs
they are prepared to make or even how stringent they believe envi
ronmental controls should be.
Sometimes, however, surveyors pose questions that frame individ
ual level trade-offs more explicitly. When asked to agree or disagree
with the idea that "we must protect the environment even if it means
increased government spending and higher taxes," 71 % still expressed
agreement.96 Even here, though, people may be thinking that most of
the taxes will be paid by someone else. When the question pro
pounded becomes even more personal, the distribution of responses
changes. In response to the question, "How willing would you be to

93. A standard survey question asks, "Please tell me . . . whether you have more confi
dence in the Democrats in Congress or the Republicans in Congress to deal with protecting
the environment." From 1993 to 2000, responses favoring Democrats have ranged from
52% to 60%, while responses favoring Republicans have ranged from 21 % to 36%. Various
surveys (on file with the author).
94. See GSS Trend Thi., supra note 92.
95. N.P.R./Kaiser/Harvard Kosovo Survey, April 1999 (survey results on file with the
author). The survey did not ask a question that isolated environmental programs from other
domestic programs.
96. CBS News/New York Times Survey, April 1990 (survey results on file with the
author).
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see a reduction in spending on the environment if you knew it would
mean that you would pay lower tmces," 62% responded that they
would be either very willing (18%) or somewhat willing (44%).97 On
the other hand, to a CBS News query of whether "you [would] be
willing to pay $100 a year more in taxes if the money were used for a
special fund to clean up the environment," 68% responded affirma
tively.98
Comparing this last question to another similar one may reveal
something of how the public's sense of the trustworthiness of govern
ment impacts on their willingness to approve increased spending.
When CBS asked simply if "you [would] be willing to pay $100 a year
more in federal taxes in order to increase spending on protecting the
environment," only 42% expressed willingness.99 It may be that the
reference in the first question to a "special fund" set up for the pur
pose suggested a specially arranged set aside, which provided indi
viduals greater confidence that the money would actually be used for
environmental purposes, rather than diverted to projects which they
supported less.
An especially strongly worded question put to the public with
some regularity asks for agreement or disagreement with the state
ment that "protecting the environment is so important that require
ments and standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental
improvements must be made regardless of cost." Throughout the En
vironmental Era, strong majorities have agreed with this statement.100
These responses suggest the public's attitude toward environmental

97. Business Week/Harris Poll, October, 1993 (emphasis added) (survey results on file
with the author).
98. CBS News Survey, March, 1991 (survey results on file with the author).
99. CBS News Survey, January, 1990 (survey results on file with the author).
100. For data through the late 1980s, see Robert Cameron Mitchell, Public Opinion and
the Green Lobby: Poised for the 1960s?, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s 81, 85
(Norman Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990). For more recent data, see various questions
polled by the Wirthlin Worldwide and the CBS/New York Times News Poll in Westlaw's
"Poll" database. In the late 1990s, the majorities agreeing with this statement have fluctu
ated between 57% and 76%. More detailed data analysis shows agreement rates are strong
across all demographic and racial groupings, but far from uniform. Interestingly, on this
question, as education or income increase, agreement with this statement declines. For ex
ample, in a 1997 CBS/New York Times survey, those with less than a high school education
were 62% in agreement; those with a post-graduate degree were 46% in agreement. People
with less than $15,000 annual income agreed 66% of the time; people with greater than
$75,000 annual income did so 38% of the time (survey results on file with the author). The
results here differ markedly from the claim made in Eco-pragmatism that "environmental
values become stronger and more sophisticated as children undergo intellectual develop
ment, and well-educated adults are markedly more pro-environmental." P. 67. Perhaps
these results can be reconciled by hypothesizing that the poll responses are most affected by
individuals becoming more sophisticated as they acquire more education, in that they come
to realize that trade-offs between environmental quality and other competing values must be
made. But see infra text accompanying note 103 (reporting positive correlations between
increased education and pro-environment responses to a different question).
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protection tilts more to the "tree huggers," those prepared to protect
the environment regardless of the cost, than it does to the "bean
counters," who always want to weigh costs and benefits before decid
ing what to do. I believe that Professor Farber himself would argue,
however, that while this may be people's initial, or prima facie, atti
tude toward the environment, once the costs have been specified and
presented in a less abstract manner, people become unwilling to incur
any cost in order to improve the environment.101 If this reservation is
sound, it underscores a general observation about responses to envi
ronmental policy questions: like the private behavior data, the public
forum data are too general and imprecise to support any conclusion
that the public has become committed to the hybrid framework, as
they fail to illuminate the details of the value structure that underlies
the public's responses.
Perhaps something more can be learned about "our" national
commitment to the environment through a better understanding of the
characteristics of those among us who most strongly exhibit this com
mitment. A number of different demographic analyses have been per
formed on the GSS/Roper spending question results, inquiring into
which individual characteristics are positively correlated with the pro
environment response that we are spending "too little" on the envi
ronment. The best predictor of positive attitudes toward the environ
ment is age - the younger responders are consistently more environ
mentally concerned than older responders.
This finding might
indicate that American support for environmental quality is increasing
over time, or it may indicate that "the present value of a clean envi
ronment is greater for those who expect to live longer."102 Education
also correlates positively with the pro-environment response,103 but
without knowing what the better-educated have learned, it is impossi
ble to say whether they have acquired a bias in favor of environmental
protection supporting the hybrid framework, or a more refined sense
of the costs of environmental degradation, thereby supporting more
environmental protection on cost-benefit grounds.
Factor analysis provides some insight into the major features of an
environmental decisionmaking situation that affect an individual's
thinking about environmental issues. Relying upon a series of ques
tions included in the 1995 American National Election Survey pilot
project that were "designed to measure attitudes toward the environ-

101. See, e.g., p. 73 ("When first thinking about toxics problems, many people begin with
the notion that carcinogens are bad things and should be eliminated from the environment at
all costs. Statutes written that way are usually stymied in the implementation phase because
sociely simply is unwilling to close down entire industries.").
102. P. 22; see also Jones & Dunlap, supra note 18, at 38 (reporting similarly that age is
the best predictor of a pro-environment response to the spending question).
103. See id.
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ment and environmental policy,"104 statistical analysis indicates that
people's attitudes toward measures to improve environmental quality
are composed of two primary factors and one secondary factor. First,
for many people, support for pro-environmental polices varies in
versely with one's desire for economic growth. Many people view
"economic concerns and environmental concerns like a seesaw - i.e.,
as one rises, the other falls."105 Some are more willing to bear the in
roads on economic growth they believe to be associated with envi
ronmental protection, while others, who may not oppose all environ
mental protection, but for whom "economic concerns trump
environmental concerns," are less willing.106 Second, people's support
of environmental protection measures varies inversely with their hos
tility toward government regulation. Such hostility influences atti
tudes toward environmental quality or protection measures because
people anticipate that those measures will be implemented through
governmental regulatory structures.107 Finally, people's perceptions of
the current condition of the environment affect one's support for envi
ronmental measures.
Overall, "concern regarding environmental
regulation [by the government] and economic concerns . . . mostly
dominate one's level of support for environmental policy," with one's
assessment of "the actual condition of the environment [also contrib
uting] to his or her environmental policy attitudes. "108 These findings
add further to our understanding of popular sentiment, but not in
ways that would permit one to say that they demonstrate public com
mitment to the hybrid framework.
Cumulatively, all these findings flesh out a picture of a majority
that generally supports environmental quality measures, is willing to
act on that preference in both their private and public lives, and that
understand issues of support for environmental quality measures to
pose choices both about the mix of economic growth and environ
mental protection, and about the acceptability of government regula
tion that comes with the implementation of those measures. People
also express significant and sustained support for the level of envi
ronmental protection that we currently have. Their strong opposition
to relaxing standards and controls indicates that their preferences are
quite sticky on the downside.
On the other hand, survey responses give us little general insight
into how individuals respond to specific environmental projects once
104. Christopher Jay Cannan, Dimensions of Environmental Policy Support in the
United States, Soc. SCI. Q. 717, 723 (1998) (quoting STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL.,
AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
105. Id. at 721.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 725.
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they are informed about the costs of those projects, the impact of them
on economic growth, or the specific environmental risks involved.
Asked about reductions in environmental protection that would pro
duce real tax rebates in their pockets, a majority opt for the reduc
tions, whereas when asked about programs in contexts in whicb it is
permissible to speculate that someone else will bear much of the costs,
favorable responses improve.109
In particular, polling data shed little light on whether people enter
tain anything that might meaningfully be called a presumption in favor
of maximum feasible environmental protection, as Professor Farber
claims. The data tell us little about the structure of the beliefs and
opinions that contribute to producing people's decisions. Someone
who generally thought that a cost-benefit approach to problemsolving
made sense might well have the general positive attitude toward envi
ronmental protection reflected in these data, if that person presumed
that our historic inattentiveness to environmental harms, or the sever
ity of newly created environmental problems, meant that even fairly
costly control measures would satisfy a cost-benefit analysis. Such a
person might, therefore, adopt a "presumption" in favor of environ
mentally protective measures, in the weak sense of being initially dis
posed to believe that most environmental problems can be attacked in
a cost-beneficial manner; but it would not be ·a strong presumption fa
voring regulation to the point of feasibility. One's decisions about en
vironmental programs depend upon background beliefs about the
state of the environment, the costs involved, and the nature of the
government intervention required - but survey questions do not es
tablish these background beliefs in routine questioning about envi
ronmental attitudes and thus do not provide a basis for extrapolating
to more specific articulations of our global commitments.
Not only are the data insufficient to support any strong presump
tion in favor of environmental controls, but the public's response to
certain environmental problems actually seems inconsistent with such
a presumption. Global warming provides a significant example. Even
though it is now undeniable that the level of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere is increasing, activists concerned with the problem of
global warming have had little success in developing a strong constitu109. The entire discussion of public attitudes here has ignored some significant distribu
tional questions, both in terms of geography, where attitudes toward public land policy, for
instance, in the Western states may vary significantly from attitudes in the East, and in terms
of race and ethnicity, where attitudes toward toxic waste cleanup, for instance, may vary sig
nificantly among different racial or ethnic groups. Were one to attempt to implement envi
ronmental policies exclusively on the basis of whether or not they properly expressed "our"
national environmental commitments, one would need to face a substantial question of who
the "we" are whose commitments should be respected. The discussion here has almost en
tirely bracketed these distributional issues, and has aimed to show that at the national level,
we are not capable of determining the shape of the nation's commitment to the environ
ment.
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ency for abating anthropogenic greenhouse gases. One concerned sci
entist has remarked that the public's attitude toward this problem re
flects "the default assumption" of "full speed ahead: It's better to ig
nore the possibility of a problem until it hits you in the face."110 Such a
default assumption is the direct opposite of a presumption in favor of
feasible controls. More generally, some longtime experts on Ameri
can environmental attitudes have difficulty seeing the national envi
ronmental commitment that Professor Farber says is unmistakable.
Denis Hayes, coordinator of the first Earth Day, has initiated a project
called Earth Day 2000, the aim of which is "to forge a global majority
around environmental values," a project in which the United States
should be in the forefront, but cannot be, he says, because we are
"backsliding" at home.111
Riley Dunlap, another longtime analyst of American environ
mental attitudes, has described our environmental dispositions as
showing a "clear consensus," but an "ambiguous commitment."112 The
commitment is ambiguous because Americans have not thoroughly
considered how they would trade competing values with environ
mental values in hard cases.
The growing belief in ecological limits and the increasing value placed on
environmental quality are widely interpreted as constituting a change in
our society's basic worldview or social paradigm, for they challenge the
way in which Americans have traditionally viewed their relationship to
the natural environment. Most Americans certainly have not fully em
braced this emerging ecological world view, especially its lifestyle impli
cations, nor clearly comprehended the contradictions between it and tra
ditional values such as economic growth, free enterprise, and private
property rights.113
Everett Carll Ladd, president of the Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research, joined with Karlyn Bowman of the American Enterprise In
stitute in another recent assessment of public attitudes toward the en
vironment. They, too, found an enduring positive attitude toward en
vironmental quality, but one that combined with an optimism that
continuing environmental improvement could be balanced with satis
factory economic growth, as well as with a faith in technological prog
ress as providing a sufficient solutions to our environmental problems,
such that severe economic dislocations or dramatic lifestyle changes

110. Geneva Overholser, Global Wanning Isn't a Hot Issue - Yet, DURHAM HERALD
SUN, Dec. 16, 1999, at A16 (quoting Jane Lubchenco, past president of the American Asso
ciation for the Advancement of Science).
111. Id.
112. Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion in the 1980s: Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Com
mitment, ENVIRONMENT, Oct 1991, at 10.
113. Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLffiCS AND POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 63, 105 (James P. Lester ed., 2d ed.

1995) (citations omitted).
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would be unnecessary.114 They cannot tell us whether Americans
would be strongly committed if such optimism proved wrong or if
technological solutions at modest costs proved insufficient.
The picture of public attitude painted by Dunlap, Ladd, and
Bowman stands in considerable contrast to that suggested in Eco
pragmatism. Americans may express support for environmental pro
tection measures, but apparently in the context of a belief that envi
ronmental quality can be achieved at an acceptable cost and without
significant personal sacrifice. While such support manifests a general
pro-environment attitude, citizen reactions to specific choices that may
make heavy personal demands on us or pose costs that are substantial
in relation to benefits remain inchoate.115
Professor Farber deploys his understanding of the nation's envi
ronmental commitments primarily to justify the hybrid approach to
environmental regulation employed by the legislature and administra
tive agencies. In addition, though, it also plays a role in his defense of
a "green canon" of statutory interpretation, which he advocates that
courts should use in interpreting legislation (p. 125). "The hybrid ap
proach would suggest interpreting ambiguous statutes to cover signifi
cant environmental risks (with an escape hatch for infeasibility)" (p.
124). He argues that a green canon embodying this suggestion can be
defended independently on grounds of plain meaning, legislative in
tent, and dynamic interpretation, thus making it defensible regardless
of which approach to statutory interpretation one might adopt (pp.
124-27).
Our national commitment to the environment relates to the third
of these interpretive approaches, dynamic interpretation, which pro
poses that judges should interpret ambiguous statutes in light of
evolving community norms (p. 125). If the content of our national
commitment to the environment remains inchoate and much more
ambiguous than Professor Farber supposes, as I have argued, it fol
lows that the argument for a green canon based on dynamic interpre
tation is significantly weakened.
The argument based on congressional intent likewise fails to un
derwrite a generally applicable green canon. While it is true that Con
gress "has applied some form of the hybrid approach" with some "fre
quency" in its statutes, this does not support the conclusion that it is
"plausible to assume that this was the legislative intent in a given case

114. See EVEREIT CARLL LADD & KARLYN H. BOWMAN, AITITUDES TOWARD THE
ENVIRONMENT 1-25 (1995).
115. The public may sometimes support some environmental measures because they
perceive that the damage far outweighs the costs. Proponents of strong environmental leg
islation have regularly taken advantage of perceived threats or a sense of crisis to move leg
islation forward, for example. Backing strong action against a serious threat can be quite
consistent with a cost-benefit mentality as with a maximum-feasible-regulation mentality.
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even if the language used is somewhat ambiguous" (p. 125). Congress
has also frequently used health-based approaches as well as risk
benefit balancing approaches to environmental regulation;116 feasibil
ity analysis is hardly so dominant among these approaches as to sup
port a general presumption in its favor. Indeed, Congress almost in
variably identifies the regulatory standard to be employed with
sufficient specificity to target which of these basic types should be
used, so that failure to do so in any specific instance may equally sup
port the conclusion that Congress has left the matter to agency discre
tion. Finally, the plain meaning of NEPA - Professor Farber's third
basis of support for the green canon - also fails to provide a con
vincing rationale for embedding the hybrid approach in a canon of
statutory interpretation.117
Although the text of Eco-pragmatism is not entirely clear on this
point, there may be a second dimension to Professor Farber's green
canon, other than the suggestion that the hybrid approach to standard
setting should be read into otherwise ambiguous statutes. When Pro
fessor Farber states that "the hybrid approach would suggest inter
preting ambiguous statutes to cover significant environmental risks
(with an escape hatch for infeasibility)" (p. 124; emphasis added), this

116. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36; supra note 36.
117. Professor Farber relies upon § 102{1) of the National Environmental Policy Act for
his plain meaning argument. That section states that "Congress authorizes and directs that,
to the fullest extent possible (1) the policies, regulations and public laws of the United States
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chap
ter." 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(1) (West 1998). The claim is that this language is "virtually identi
cal" to the hybrid approach and hence embodies the green canon. Pp. 126-27. The central
statement of NEPA's policy is set forth in § 101, which states that it is the
continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and meas
ures . . . in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can live in productive harmony, and fulfill
the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations.
42 U.S.C.A. § 4331{1) {West 1998). Professor Farber makes much of the phrase "to the full
est extent possible" in describing the extent to which statutes should be interpreted in accor
dance with NEPA's policies, but he makes too little of the policy statement itself, which con
tains a caveat of practicability, and which fails to resolve situations in which environmental
values conflict with other elements of the "general welfare" or with other elements of the
"social and economic . . . requirements" of present generations. A proponent of CBA could
well argue that such trade-offs invite a cost-benefit approach just as easily as they invite a
feasibility approach, in which case the interpretive principle to be found in NEPA would be
that "to the fullest extent possible," courts and agencies should attempt to weigh costs
against benefits. The principle would be, in other words, to do careful analysis of all the con
sequences, pro and con, before engaging in environmentally harmful activity - a principle
entirely consistent with one of the underlying rationales of NEPA, which is to "enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems important to the Nation." 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West
1998). The essential accomplishment of NEPA was to place environmental values, which
had until then often been ignored, on the list of mandatory considerations prior to agency
action, but it did not commit policymakers to employing any particular methodology for
considering them. See generally Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223 {1980) {holding that NEPA was essentially procedural and left to agency discretion
how environmental considerations would be balanced in an overall decisionmaking process).
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may be meant to relate the green canon to the threshold issue of when
enough information exists to bring a potential environmental harm
within the jurisdiction of an environmental statute, rather than, or in
addition to the subsequent issue of what standard should govern the
regulation of that potential harm once it has been found to be within
the statute's jurisdiction.118 If this is correct, then Professor Farber
seems to be advocating that ambiguous environmental statutes should
be construed to authorize the abatement of potential environmental
harm before we have completely convincing evidence that the harm
would actually occur.
Such a presumption is widely used and useful. The issue of how
much we must know before we can intervene was squarely faced in
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,119 a case that stands alongside Reserve Mining at
the headwaters of judicial application of environmental values. Ethyl
Corp. raised the question of whether the EPA had enough informa·
tion concerning the connection between lead additives in gasoline to
adverse human health effects to support an agency order phasing
down the lead content of gasoline under a statute authorizing regula·
tion of additives that "will endanger the public health or welfare."120
Writing for the en bane majority of the D.C. Circuit, Judge Skelly
Wright agreed with the agency's construction of the statute to permit
agency action in advance of rigorous proof of a cause and effect rela·
tionship between lead and adverse health effects. "Where a statute is
precautionary in nature, the evidence is difficult to come by, uncertain,
or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the
regulations designed to protect the public health, and the decision that
of an expert administrator," such rigorous proof is not required.121
Judge Wilkey in dissent insisted that "the causal connection between
lead emissions and the harm must be established by relevant scientific
and medical evidence" before the agency had authority to regulate
lead in gasoline.122
Judge Wright's view has prevailed in the public arena, in Congress,
and in the courts: one of the premises upon which our environmental
regulatory regime stands is the conclusion that public action to pre·

118. A basis for this belief is Professor Farber's claim that the green canon would pro·
vide a firmer basis for the conclusion of the Reserve Mining court that it was authorized to
proceed in a "precautionary or preventive sense," that is to say, in advance of firm evidence
that the mining company's mill tailings would cause adverse health effects among the popu
lation of Duluth. P. 124 (quoting Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 492, 529
(8th Cir. 1974)).
119. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
120. See Clean Air Act § 211(c)(l)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(l)(A) (1967) (trans
ferred and codified as 42 U.S.C.S. § 7545 (c)(l)(A) (Lexis 1997)).
121. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 27.
122. Id. at 95.
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vent harm is appropriate in advance of completely reliable scientific
verification of the inevitability of that harm should we fail to act.123
This claim leaves much unsaid, as some factual basis for intervention is
surely required, and the decision that certainty is not required before
preventive action fails to clarify how much knowledge is required.
Disagreements over what constitutes "good science," the desirability
of conservative default assumptions, the use of worst-case scenarios, as
well as standards of judicial review of agency action, all raise this issue,
and these disagreements have continued unabated throughout the En
vironmental Era.124 Still, this much of Professor Farber's green canon
does have a solid pedigree in our practices, our statutes, and our broad
It should be noted,
attitudes toward environmental protection.
though, that some precautionary action is entirely compatible with
CBA: whenever the magnitude of some environmental damage, dis
counted by the probability that the damage will actually occur, ex
ceeds the costs of prevention, CBA advocates the preventive measure.
To sum up this point, "our profound national commitment to the
environment" cannot support the weight that Professor Farber rests
on it, either to vindicate the hybrid approach to policy or the green
canon of statutory interpretation.
That said, however, there is one particular type of environmental
problem where stronger evidence in support of his "environmental
baseline" can be found. When environmental harms pose a discerni
ble risk to human life or threaten serious adverse health effects, it is
possible to discern a public favoring maximum feasible environmental
controls. Survey questions usually fail to distinguish between envi
ronmental issues, broadly defined, and those issues that implicate sig
nificant human health risks, so they cannot provide a source for ex
ploring this distinction. The history of the entire environmental
movement lends some credence to it, though.
That movement
achieved an entirely new level of policy significance when subtle envi
ronmental harms were linked to human health in the 1960s, as through
Rachel Carson's pathbreaking Silent Spring, as well as through other

123. Congress later ratified Judge Wright's conclusion by amending the Clean Air Act
to make the precautionary nature of the statute clearer. See, e.g., Sanford Gaines, Science,
Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks Through Law, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 271 (1990)
("In 1977, responding to the vigorous contest over precautionary regulation in the case of
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA . . Congress amended several sections of the Clean Air Act . . . 'to em
phasize the precautionary or preventive purpose of the Act (and, therefore, the Administra
tor's duty to assess risk rather than wait for proof of actual harm).' ") H.R. REP. No. 294, at
51 (1977). The amendments specified that the EPA had authority to regulate not only pol
lutants that "may cause" [or "may endanger"] serious health effects (the original wording),
but also those that "may reasonably be anticipated to result in" such effects. Pub. L. No. 9505, S 401, 91 Stat. 790-91 (1977).
.

.

124. For a critique of some of the aspects of regulatory policy that raise the issue of ac
tion in the face of uncertainty, see Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary
Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996).
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studies tying chemical exposure to dreaded health problems, most no
tably cancer, but also including birth defects and neurological deficits.
While it is a matter of some controversy just how much of a role the
human health link played in producing strong support for environ
mental policies,125 that role was certainly substantial.126 Furthermore,
almost all of the instances of feasibility-based approaches currently in
place within our existing environmental practices address human
health risks.127 One is drawn most strongly to Professor Farber's ar
guments for the feasibility framework, in my view, just to the extent
that one has public health effects, rather than other sorts of environ
mental harms in mind.
Focusing on life-threatening environmental hazards brings new
considerations into play in the choice between the hybrid framework
and CBA. One problem that CBA-based frameworks face in ad
dressing significant human health hazards has less to do with adopting
a neutral stance toward the question of reducing environmental harm
as it does with assuming a reductionist stance toward human life. Life
effectively becomes a commodity under a fully monetized CBA, a
production value, something whose worth can be captured, without
remainder, by some monetary amount.128 That we are reluctant flatly
to declare that human life can fully be captured by some finite mone
tary value is strongly suggested by the behavior of our public officials.
No official has ever defended an action that resulted in the loss of life
by standing in front of constituents and baldly declaring that, "the ex
perts told us that our decision would result in loss of life, and we could

A
125. Compare Donald T. Hornstein, SelfInterest, Politics, and the Environment
Response to Professor Schroeder, 9 DUKE. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 61, 73 {1998) (arguing that
-

the "power of ideas" must be acknowledged as a crucial aspect of environmentalism's ap
peal) with Schroeder, supra note 3 (arguing that heightened concern over environmental
causes of risks to human health may explain the political success of environmentalism early
in the Environmental Era).
126. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 3, at 32-33 ("A key development in the 1960s was
the emergence of national concern about environmental health. . . . By the 1960s national
concern about public health returned to a question raised more than 100 years earlier: what
harm did the ordinary surroundings of everyday life impose on human health? With the
benefit of improving science, public attention turned to cigarettes and sweeteners, and to air
and water pollution.").
127. See sources cited supra note 37. Professor Farber's own examples reflect this as
well, when he notes that
Congress has treated environmental risks as impermissible except when required by consid
erations of feasibility. Rather than cost-benefit analysis, Congress has adopted a pro
environmental baseline for the control of air and water pollution, carcinogens in the work
place, and hazardous waste sites, and much less often called for cost-benefit analysis or
open-ended balancing.

P. 103 {footnotes omitted). In each of these cases of the feasibility approach, public health
effects have been a dominant congressional concern.
128. See text accompanying notes 40-41.
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have taken steps to prevent it, but they just would have cost more than
a human life is worth."
Of course, it is always possible to interpret an action that stops
short of 100% protection as having implicitly placed a value on human
life. By brute computational force, that value can be determined by
dividing compliance costs by the statistical estimate of the risk reduc
tion achieved by the action. Thanks to the requirement that agencies
prepare regulatory impact assessments for major rules, agencies rou
tinely provide the data to permit at least an approximate calculation.129
Nonetheless, in much the same way as Holmes's dog could tell the dif
ference between being kicked and being tripped over,130 there remains
an enormous difference between explicitly declaring human life to
have finite value and implicitly doing so. Embracing the pricelessness
of life constitutes a "useful nonsense." "It is useful to talk that way,
thereby inclining our minds to place high value on life, precisely be
cause we constantly must act in ways that cause that value to be jostled
and compromised by competing values."131
Against this background, a feasibility framework provides a way to
talk about some of the more significant obstacles to eliminating all
manmade risk without being compelled to express the competition of
clashing values in simple dollar-and-cents terms. In fact, if you listen
to the way people debate life and death decisions, they seldom frame
the choice as a stark issue of life versus dollars. If anything can be le
gitimately put opposite human life on a balance scale, it is not "mere"
costs, but rather the adverse impact that imposing those costs will have
on the lives of others.132 Opposing values are described qualitatively.
Alternatively, costs figure in, not by virtue of an assessment that it
would simply not be worthwhile to spend more, but rather because
further action is infeasible - we are just unable productively to spend
more, or the amount that would be required exceeds our ability to
pay, not our willingness to pay. There undoubtedly is an element of

129. Such agency figures, sometimes with adjustments, form the basis for the cost per
life saved figures of the famous Morrall table. Although that table has been widely cited for
the proposition that federal regulations vary enormously in their cost-effectiveness, Lisa
Heinzerling has argued that the Morrall table overstates the variance. See Heinzerling, su
pra note 65. To the extent that regulations written under a non-CBA-based framework nev
ertheless roughly converge on how costly they are per life saved, this lends some credence to
Professor Farber's observation that agencies will inevitably "peak" at the costs of regulations
even when their statutory framework advises them not to do so.
130. 0. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1881),
reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 109, 116 (Sheldon M. Novick
ed., 1995).
131. GEORGE WILL, "Life ls Priceless" ls Useful Nonsense, in SUDDENLY: THE
AMERICAN IDEA ABROAD AND AT HOME, 1986-1990, at 204, 206 (1990). This is a claim
about the expressive function of law. Professor Farber notes different expressive function
problems with CBA as well. See pp. 117-19.
132 See infra text accompanying notes 134-135.
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word play in such distinctions as these. The stark reality is that both
individually and collectively, we have other demands on scarce re
sources than creating a society with negligible risks of environmental
harm. One reason additional risk-reducing measures are not afford
able is that after a point, we listen to those other demands and devote
resources to them, thereby having less left for the protection of life.
Still, the word play engaged in when talking about feasibility and sig
nificant risk seems more felicitous in articulating people's relation
ships to these competing demands than the harsh terms of CBA.
Consider the EPA's experience in the early 1980s in dealing with
the ASARCO plant near Tacoma, Washington.133 The ASARCO
copper-smelting plant's air emissions contained arsenic, a poison that
the EPA's risk assessors projected would produce fatalities in the
downwind population if left unabated. The EPA opened considera
tion of whether to require ASARCO to install best available control
technology (BAT) at its facility, or whether to require greater-than
BAT controls. Pivotal to that question was a determination as to
whether the residual risk remaining after BAT was in place ought to
be considered "unreasonable."
The EPA sought public advice as to that question by holding a se
ries of workshops and public meetings in the vicinity of the plant. At
those gatherings, the choice was not framed as one requiring a deter
mination of how much a human life was worth, which would then be
compared with compliance costs, although compliance costs were very
much on people's minds due to the human consequences those costs
would have. Rather, because ASARCO claimed it would be unable to
afford more stringent controls and would therefore be forced to close
the plant if asked to install greater-than-BAT controls, the issue be
came one of jobs, impact on the local economy, and the adverse hu
man impacts produced by unemployment contrasted with the human
health risks of continued exposure to ASARCO's emissions.134
ASARCO never defended against the more stringent controls by ar
guing that the lives that would be lost if the more lax standard were
selected were not worth the money. Instead it contested the EPA's
science, arguing that its emissions currently posed no health threat.135
Standards based on maximum feasible controls were explicitly ad
vocated at the public hearings. The National Audubon Society testi
fied at the ASARCO hearing,
If EPA finds zero emissions of a pollutant to be impossible, they should
set the standards at the lowest levels possible rather than at the levels

133. For a summary of these events, see Esther Scott, The Risks of Asarco, in ETHICS
AND PoLmcs 163 (Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson eds., 2d ed. 1990).
134. See id. at 168-70.
135. See id. at 170-71.
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achievable through pollution control technologies easily affordable by
the polluting industries. In order to protect [the public] health, standards
must be used to force technological innovation in pollution control rather
than to simply reinforce the status quo.136
This sounds strongly reminiscent of the national commitment for
which Professor Farber argues, but again, in the context of environ
mental hazards to public health.
Beyond whatever expressive norms discourage us from talking
openly in neutral cost-benefit terms about loss of human life, argu
ments for maximum feasible controls in such situations also tap into a
very strong corrective justice norm that drives many public policies.
As traditional tort practice amply demonstrates, the common law long
ago assigned to each of us an entitlement to be free from serious bod
ily injury at the hands of another. Tort law does not sanction the de
liberate taking of the life of another by private acts.137 Philosophical
arguments about stylized dilemmas like the Trolley Problem some
times produce results condoning the deliberative destruction of life to
save other lives, but actual tort law does not authorize even that, save
self-defense.138 It is no wonder that some of the most rhetorically
powerful moments in the meetings over the ASARCO plant emissions
were those that invoked this norm, as when one resident of a down
wind community remarked that having the plant in operation was like
"somebody standing on the other side of the city line with a thirty
ought-six and firing it into Tacoma."139
In sum, something like the hybrid approach does seem to match up
well with our commitments when human life is at issue in environ
mental decisionmaking. Among other things, this helps explain why

136. Id. at 171 (quoting National Audubon Society testiniony at ASARCO hearing).
137. So-called risk-versus-risk situations point to some of the difficulties of automatic
translation of common law norms into the environmental era. In cases of risk-versus-risk,
the risk-reducing policy move will produce changes that increase other kinds of risks. A par
ticularly clear illustration arose in the EPA's recent rulemaking to review the ambient air
quality standard for ozone. Some who contested tightening the standard pointed out that in
the course of lowering the risks of lung-related health effects associated with heightened
ozone levels, the EPA would be increasing the risk of melanoma, since atmospheric ozone
screens out UV(B) radiation, which is associated with skin cancer. One of the grounds for
the D.C. Circuit's reversal of the rulemaking was the EPA's failure to give risk-versus-risk
issues closer attention. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d. 1027, 1051-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (per curiam), modified per curiam, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, No.
99-1257 68 U.S.L.W. 3734 (U.S. May 23, 2000) cross-petition granted, No. 99-1426 (U.S. May
30, 2000). On risk-versus-risk problems generally, see JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN
BAERT WIENER, RISK V. RISK (1995).
138. See George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and
Moral Points of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975 (1999) (analyzing and refuting various interpreta
tions of common law tort as authorizing the taking of human life to save the life of another);
Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395 (1985) (describing classic
moral dilemma in which a runaway trolley will kill five persons unless switched off the track,
inevitably killing a passerby).
139. Scott, supra note 133, at 165.
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environmental advocates often strive to relate their causes to such ef
fects.140
I have one remaining query with respect to Professor Farber's hy
brid framework, and that is to question whether his CBA-based "dis
proportionate costs" proviso squares up with how citizens typically
think about competing values in such situations. Over the past several
decades, considerable research has demonstrated that people do not
view risk solely in terms of cold numerical calculations of expected
mortality. They are sensitive to qualitative dimensions of risk situa
tions as well.141 Quite plausibly, the way people respond to considera·
tions of cost is not adequately captured solely in dollar-and-cents
terms either. People apparently do realize, as Professor Farber ar
gues, that it is absurd to chase risk reduction regardless of the conse
quences, but it could well be that what matters to them with respect to
those consequences turns importantly on factors such as the distribu
tion of those costs, the qualitative impact the costs will have on whom
ever bears them, and so on, rather than, or in addition to, their dollar
magnitude.
As a thought experiment, suppose it were discovered that Win
dows 98 contained a peculiar virus that can infrequently cause a per
sonal computer to explode, potentially injuring its user. Statisticians
have calculated that the five million copies of defective operating sys
tems currently installed will likely produce three fatalities over the
economic life of the operating system. At a cost of $75 per computer,
Microsoft can replace the defective system with a different version, for
a total cost of $375 million. Let's assume no one at Microsoft, which
currently has cash reserves in the billions of dollars, will lose a job.
The regulatory decision is whether Microsoft should spend $125 mil
lion per fatality avoided to eliminate the risk. Eco-pragmatism 's hy
brid approach would veto this measure, on the grounds of grossly dis
proportionate costs.142 Doesn't it seem plausible, nonetheless, that the
government might order Microsoft to make the fix assuming the exis
tence of a statute authorizing the action ?143

140. Professor Farber notes that the Reserve Mining litigation itself acquired an entirely
new level of urgency once the focus of harmful effects shifted from ecological damage to
Lake Superior to potential health risks to the population of Duluth. Pp. 175-76.
141. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
142. Professor Farber considers a $50 million expenditure to save a life to be a "bit ex
travagant," p. 87, and on that basis I am assuming he would consider $125 million to accom
plish the same task to be grossly disproportionate.
143. Fear of products liability awards in excess of $375 million might convince Microsoft
to act in any event.
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IV.
Three decades into the Environmental Era, our settled commit
ments respecting our relationship to the environment remain under
construction. The years that come will continue to pose challenges,
perhaps placing stress on the technological optimism and sense of rela
tively easily trade-offs that seem to underwrite much of our current
attitudes and hence prevent us from getting a sure fix on them with re
spect to hard cases. Or perhaps not - perhaps our values will develop
and shift in such a way that maximum feasible protection of the envi
ronment will be matched by changes in lifestyle expectations that
make the ensuing distribution and production of goods and services
largely acceptable.

In our present circumstances, a clear role exists for leadership in
developing the ideas and principles necessary to disambiguate our
commitments. After Abraham Lincoln had remarked upon the p ower
of public sentiment in a democracy, he concluded his thought by add
ing, "Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than
he who enacts statutes and pronounces decisions."144 Eco-pragmatism

does not succeed in convincing us that if we embraced its approach we
would be simply acknowledging commitments already made, but it
does succeed in making the hybrid approach seem plausible, and sheds
much clearer light on complex topics along the way. By virtue of
those successes, Eco-pragmatism enhances the case for such an ap
proach in lieu of more thorough reliance on CBA, so that it will con
tinue to play a part in the ongoing process of understanding and con
structing our commitments.

144. Rivers, supra note 39, at 53.

